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With apologies in advance for the length of this email (there
is no simple or easy way to tackle pension reform), we tackle our
pension nightmare.
Rhode Island's unfunded pension liability is seven billion
dollars, or seven thousand dollars for every man, woman and child
living in the state. This one issue, if left unresolved, has
the ability to ravage the state's finances as far into the future as
one can see. The pension debate is highly charged and
difficult to fully understand. In short, the pension
benefits that Rhode Island has promised to our state and municipal
workers far exceed the state's and worker's abilities to fund.
Though complicated, the math behind this statement is undeniable,
and the empirical evidence of our massive unfunded pension liability
speaks for itself. What follows is a short primer on
the pension situation, followed by the math to back up my previous
statements. Definitions Most
state employees and many municipal employees in Rhode Island
(including teachers) receive pensions. A pension
differs from a 401K retirement account in several key
ways: A pension (in the
context of our state and local employees) typically pays a retiree a
percentage of that employee's salary. A 401K makes available a
pool of money for retirement that an employee has saved up over a
lifetime of work. There is no limit on the funds
expended to pay for a retiree's pension. A retired worker who
collects a pension can live for 50 years post-retirement and collect
his or her pension. On the other hand, once a retired
employee's 401K accounts have been drawn down to zero, retirement
benefits (outside of social security benefits)
end. Retirees who receive either pensions or 401K
payouts have contributed money into their respective plans.
The taxpayer is on the hook to make good on a pension
plan's promises. No guarantees back a 401K
account. Retirees who depend on pension benefits are
shielded from the volatility of the stock market. Although
pension funds need to be invested in the stock market to realize
returns on investment high enough to make good on promised benefits
(much more on this below), it is the tax payer who incurs the risks
of investing pension monies in the market. If a pension fund
is decimated by a poorly performing market (a situation we all face
right now), the tax payer must provide additional monies into the
pension fund to guarantee that all pensions can be paid in
full. A 401K recipient bears his or her own risk of investing
in the market. A COLA is a Cost Of Living
Adjustment. A COLA is used to help minimize the detrimental
effect that inflation can have on a retiree's income. In many
instances, COLAs are pegged to the inflation rate. For many RI
pensions, fixed 3% COLAs are in place, without regard to the
inflation rate. The net effect of an annual 3% COLA is a 3%
'raise' to all pension recipients whose pension plans have this
fixed COLA. Compound interest is a powerful tool for
savings. Compound interest involves adding accumulated
interest back to the principal invested, making the amount of
invested principal grow, which earns more interest, etc, etc, etc
(definition mostly courtesy of Wikipedia).
The problem Take a
mythical worker (let's call him Ken) who is working towards
retirement with a state pension. Ken plans on working for 30
years, and has been contributing 9.25% of his earnings towards his
pension account. Ken's pension is calculated by taking 60% of
the average of his salary for his last 3 years of employment.
If Ken's average salary for the last 3 years was $50,000, his annual
pension would be $30,000. Ken began working at age 25 and will
retire at age 55. If he lives to be 80, he will draw a pension
for 25 years. It is important to recognize that Ken's
salary over 30 years has gone up. When he started contributing
to his pension as a new employee, his salary was $20,000, and grew
3% every year for 30 years, culminating with a $50,000
salary. Over the course of 30 years, $91,000 and change
was paid into the pension plan by Ken. Assuming that the plan
was earning a healthy (and currently unrealistic) 7% return, the
money paid in by Ken with compound interest becomes
$273,000. If Ken draws a flat $30,000 annual pension
(no COLA involved), he will have exhausted the money saved in his
pension account at year 14 of his retirement. The taxpayers of
the state need to make up the difference to fully fund his
retirement. To fill the gap and extend Ken's pension to age
80, Rhode Island must kick in 3.5% of Ken's salary during every year
of his employment (keeping in mind a 7% investment return). If
the investment return drops to 5%, the state must then kick in
11.75% of his salary during every year of his
employment. The real kicker to this scenario is the 3%
COLA applied to many of the State's pension recipients.
Bearing in mind that the 3% COLA increases the annual pension payout
to the pension recipient, and also bearing in mind that this 3% COLA
is itself compounded for every year that a pension recipient draws a
pension, we have a very different set of numbers. With
a 3% annual COLA and a 7% investment return, Ken exhausts his
initial payments into his pension fund at year 11, versus year 14
without the COLA. The state needs to kick in 8.25% to meet
Ken's pension needs. With a 5% investment return, the state
must kick in 20.75%. With numbers like these, is it any wonder
that we have an unfunded pension liability? If the
State's payments into the pension fund for Ken are not made for
several years, the real cost to the state to make up for these
payments skyrockets due to the compounding of interest. In the
same way that a $91,000 investment over 30 years turned into
$273,000, the same is true for funds not paid in to the
system. Every year where RI does not fully fund the pension
plan places us further and further behind, with the rate of falling
behind accelerating with every year that passes. Since
Rhode Island's economy is stagnant and has been for quite some time,
it is irresponsible to assume that we can 'grow' our way out of this
problem. If Rhode Island's economy were expanding and our tax
revenues increasing as a result of this growth, a case could be made
that given enough time we could cover our pension liabilities.
Sadly, the test of time has shown that our economy is shrinking,
making a bad problem all the worse. One factor that
makes the pension mess even messier is the practice of juicing a
soon-to-be-retiring employee's salary at the end of his or her
career. This practice provides a nice assist to the retiree in
terms of the pension that he or she can draw, but really crushes the
math behind paying for the retirement. Allowing a
worker to retire on a pension after only 20 years of service also
severely undermines the pension arithmetic, as does the practice of
allowing a worker to buy years of vesting in a state
pension. What can be
done The COLAs for all state pension plans
must be significantly reduced immediately. This reduction must
be applied to current pensioners, workers with 20 years or more
under their belts as well as newer hires. Tying COLAs to
inflation is one idea, maybe linked to a year or two with no COLA
since inflation has been virtually non-existent for the last few
years. No worker should be able to begin drawing on
their pension until age 67, just like Social Security.
Lowering the number of years that a pension will be drawn upon will
have a radical impact on the pension math. These 2
changes will go a very long way towards solving our pension funding
problem. Governor Carcieri touches on the COLA issue with his
current reform proposals, but does not go far enough. He does
incorporate raising the eligibility age into his
reforms. Conclusion It is
vitally important for protect future generations of Rhode Island tax
payers (our children and grandchildren) from our unfunded pension
liabilities. It is equally important to ensure that the state
pension system remains financially sound and capable of supporting
all retirees who will rely on the fund. These painful
adjustments now should head off even more radical changes down the
road.
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